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Summary 
The growing attention to global warming due to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the 
process of fossil fuel--based energy production is expressed in the Kyoto Protocol, 
which prescribes, on average, a 7 percent reduction in GHG emissions for developed 
countries. Although Israel was not included in the list of the obligated countries 
("Annex A"), it should consider the economic implications of participating in the 
emission reduction effort, as such a commitment becomes highly feasible following the 
Bali roadmap which oblige a successor to the Kyoto Protocol to launch negotiations 
including all parties to the UNFCCC on a future framework, stressing the role of 
cooperative action and of common though differentiated responsibility. This study 
aimed to quantify the economy-wide consequences for Israel of meeting the targets of 
the Kyoto Protocol, employing a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model of the 
Israeli economy. Initially, to this end, we constructed a social accounting matrix (SAM) 
to serve as a benchmark by combining physical energy and emission data and economic 
data from various sources. The efficacy of decentralized economic incentives for CO2 
emission reduction, such as carbon taxes on emissions and auctioned emission permits, 
was assessed in terms of their impact on economic welfare. In addition, we tested for 
the ensuing so-called double dividend. Two distinct cases were analyzed. In the first 
one, we tested a revenue-neutral environmental policy which proportionally cut pre-
existing taxes. Labour supply was assumed to be exogenously fixed. The results showed 
that, although significant CO2 emission reduction can be achieved, followed by modest 
economic cost, no double dividend could be discerned. Next, in order to check for the 
employment double dividend (lower CO2 emissions and lower unemployment), we 
introduced labor market imperfections, with the aim of cutting income tax. The results 
of this case indicate that an employment double dividend is possible under a rather 
standard set of assumptions. Moreover, for higher substitutability between the energy 
composite input and the labor-capital one, an even “strong” form of double dividend can 
be obtained. We performed several sensitivity analyses with respect to the modeled 
production function, which re-confirmed the finding that higher substitution 
possibilities lead to lower welfare costs 3 associated with a given emission reduction 
target. We qualify this general result by also showing that the opposite holds when the 
emission tax rate is held constant, rather than reduced. It may be concluded on the basis 
of this analysis that a double dividend may be an achievable goal under a GHG 
emission reduction policy in the case of economies such as Israel. The CGE approach 
applied in this research is adopted for the first time to the Israeli economy and should 
contribute to better informed debate on environmental policy in Israel. 
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1.  Introduction 
As a party to the UNFCCC since May 1996 and as a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol since 
December 1998, Israel is committed to fulfilling its obligations for reducing GHG emissions into 
the atmosphere. Israel is defined as a developing country under the Convention and not included in 
Annex I. However, the roadmap of the Climate Change Conference in Bali identifies that Israel may 
become obligated for GHG reduction in the following post Kyoto agreements. 
Although the baseline year for Annex I countries is 1990, Israel has set its baseline year for 
compliance with the obligations of the UNFCCC as 1996 due to the unprecedented growth in both 
population and economy which occurred during the first part of the decade. During this period, 
nearly a million  immigrants arrived in the country, thus increasing the population by almost a fifth 
and bringing about a sharp increase in energy use and as a consequence, GHG emissions.  
A number of special circumstances dictate the  need for mitigating the  effects of climate 
change in Israel including the following (IFNCCC, 2000): 
·  Israel's population density and its location at the edge of the desert make it especially 
vulnerable to climate change. Some 60% of the population resides in a narrow coastal 
strip along the Mediterranean Sea; 90% of the population is concentrated in 30% of 
the land area in this Mediterranean region. 
·  Israel's  freshwater  resources  are  limited  and  are  dependent  on  seasonal  rainfall  to 
replenish  groundwater and surface sources. Climate change may affect the rainfall 
regime. 
·  The coastal strip, with its vital infrastructures, natural resources and phreatic aquifer is 
particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels. 
·  Technologies  for  reducing  GHG  emissions  in  different  sectors  (e.g.,  electricity 
generation,  transport,  waste,  agriculture,  heating/cooling  of  buildings,  etc.)  are 
expected  to  carry  additional  advantages  such  as  emission  reduction  from  other 
pollutants which damage public health, infrastructure and water sources. 
The contribution of sectors to total CO2 equivalent emissions is presented in Figure 1. By far 
the largest source of CO2 emissions is the oxidation of carbon when fossil fuels are burned to 
produce energy. Cement production is the most important non-energy industrial process emitting 
CO2. The contribution of GHG emissions from agriculture is dominant. Emissions are attributed to 
direct  emissions  from  agriculture  soils,  manure  management  and  animal  grazing,  and  indirect 
emissions from agriculture.  
   5
Figure 1: Contribution of Sectors to Total CO2 Equivalent Emissions in Israel in 1996: 







The  contribution  of  GHGs  to  total CO2  equivalent  emissions  is  shown in  Figure  2.  The 
proportions of methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), as opposed to that of carbon dioxide (CO2), 
are small. This analysis centers on carbon dioxide abatement alone. However, since the quantities of 
N2O and CO2 emitted in fuel combustion are correlated, abatement of the latter will cause some 
decrease of the former. Methane abatement mostly concerns treatment of solid waste and therefore 
may be omitted from the discussion as it requires a different kind of consideration. 
Figure 2. Contribution of Greenhouse Gases to Total CO2 Equivalent Emissions in Israel  in 
1996: (Source: Avnimelech, Y. et al., 2000) 
 
Table 1 summarizes the emissions and removals of CO2, CH4 and N2O from the different 
sectors of the Israeli economy as estimated for 1996. Methane and nitrous oxide emissions are 
converted  to  a  CO2  equivalent  by  means  of  the  Global  Warming  Potential  (GWP)  which  is  a 
measure of the radiative effects of the different GHGs relative to CO2.    6
Table 1: Summary of GHG emissions and removals (1996, kilotons): (Source: IFNCCC, 2000)
1 







Energy (Fuel combustion)  50,344  3.55  0.58  50,705  50,599 
Energy Industries  28,466  0.57  0.36  28,599  28,590 
Manufacture & Construction  6,720  0.23  0.07  6,752  6,746 
Transport  11,031  2.18  0.12  11,187  11,114 
Commercial/Institutional/Residential  3,520  0.49  0.029  3,555  3,539 
Agriculture  607  0.08  0.005  612  610 
Industrial Processes  1,889    1.73  2,373  2,425 
Cement Production  1,673      1,673  1,673 
Lime Production  107      107  107 
Soda Ash Use  17      17  17 
Ammonia Production  92        92 
Nitric Acid Production      1.73  484  536 
Agriculture    42.4  3.81  3,441  2,071 
Domestic Livestock    32.4    1,814  680 
Manure Management    10  0.8  784  458 
Soil Emissions      3.01  843  933 
Forestry  -370      -370  -370 
Waste    380    21,280  7,980 
Municipal Solid Waste    370    20,720  7,770 
Waste Treatment    10    560  210 
Total  51,863  425.5  6.12  77,429  62,705 
To conclude, as a small country, Israel is also a small contributor to global warming. Israel 
contributes  less  than  0.5%  of  global  carbon  emissions,  which  is  approximately  the  level  of 
emissions of such countries as Austria and Denmark. Nevertheless the sensitivity of the country to 
the  impacts  of  the  impending  global  and  regional  changes,  on  the  one  hand,  and  international 
incentives,  on  the  other  hand,  dictate  the  integration  of  national  policy  with  international 
agreements.  
This study aims to quantify the economic consequences of meeting the targets of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Both the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model of the Israeli economy and a 
social accounting matrix (SAM) with energy and emission data are constructed specifically for this 
purpose. The efficacy of economic incentives for GHG emissions reduction, such as taxes on the 
emission and auctioned emission permits, are assessed and considered in terms of their impact on 
the country's economic welfare.  
                                                  
1 Summary of GHG emissions and removals table updated for 2004 is presented in Appendix A, table A.1.    7
In addition, the study tests the possibility for double dividend. The question as to whether the 
strong  form of double  dividend or employment double dividend holds, heavily depends on the 
structure of the economy. While a green tax reform is likely to fail to increase non-environmental 
welfare in economies with functioning labour markets, it may succeed in economies suffering from 
involuntary unemployment. We check this statement transforming the basic model assumptions on 
labour market structure and tax revenue recycling system.   
The next chapter reviews studies focused on the economic aspects of global warming in 
Israel. Chapter 3 describes the structure of the static energy-environment CGE model employed in 
the research, followed by a discussion of the data in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the results of the 
simulations  produced  with  the  model  assuming  an  exogenous  labour  supply.  Alternatively,  in 
Chapter 6 economic incentives to reduce CO2 emissions are replicated under the assumption of 
labour  market  imperfections  and  different  green  policy  revenue  recycling  scheme.  Chapter  7 
summarizes, concludes and outlines the areas that warrant further research. 
2.  Literature Review 
This review focuses on research assessing global warming impacts on the Israeli economy. 
Most of the related literature deals with evaluation of "market damages", i.e. industry based cost/ 
benefit assessment:  
Haim  et  al.  (2007)  explored  economic  aspects  of  agricultural  production  under  projected 
climate-change scenarios by the “production function” approach, as applied to two representative 
crops: wheat and cotton. Results for wheat varied among climate scenarios; net revenues became 
negative under the severe scenario, but may increase under the moderate one. By contrast, under 
both scenarios cotton was found to experience a considerable decrease in yield with significant 
economic losses.  
Kan et al. (2007) followed a series of two previous studies: a preliminary study by Yehoshua 
and Shechter (2003), who employed a simple production function model approach to assess the 
economic impact of climate change on the agricultural sector in Israel; and a more elaborated study, 
using the same production function approach, by Kadishi, et al. (2003). Kan et al. developed a 
model  that  enables  assessment  of  climate-change  impacts  on  optimal  agricultural  management, 
where adaptation to water quality and quantity changes is considered endogenously with respect to 
both the extensive and intensive margins. 
Yehoshua et al. (2007) analyzed the major impact of sea level rise – manifested principally in 
land loss due to inundation and erosion - on Israel's Mediterranean coast. Given the specific and 
rather unique nature of the Israeli coastline, this study has employed specific tools to assess the   8
damages. The economic assessment focused mainly on valuing the beaches as a public resource for 
recreation, using methods such as CVM and TCM. 
Avnimelech,  Y.  et  al.  (2000)  scanned  GHG  polluting  sectors  of  the  Israeli  economy  and 
provided sector based policy guidelines for GHG emission reduction in the form of technical and 
economic measures.  
A small selection of studies attempted to evaluate the economy wide costs and benefits of 
global warming mitigation. Tiraspolsky (2003) examined the effectiveness of a national carbon tax 
scheme applied to different emitting sectors and inspected some distributive and competitiveness 
effects  arising  from  this  application.  The  argument  for  modest-level  regressivity  of  tax  in  the 
residential sector was confirmed by partial analysis of distributional incidence of a modeled carbon 
tax of NIS
2 70 per ton of CO2. 
Gressel  et  al.  (2000)  assessed  the  demand  functions  for  fossil  fuels  and  electricity  and 
analyzed welfare losses caused by carbon taxes on these goods. However, this approach evaluated 
costs for energy addicted sectors without incorporating substitutes.  
The Israeli economic literature lacks a research which analyzes the economy-wide effects of 
economic incentives for GHGs emission mitigation on a general equilibrium modeling basis. As 
previously shown, the most important GHG carbon dioxide, which is an anthropogenic emission, is 
largely due to the combustion of carbon-rich fossil fuels. On the supply side of the economy, fossil 
fuels are the sole large-scale source of energy, while on the demand side, energy is employed as an 
input to virtually every activity, raising concerns that even modest taxes or quantitative limits on 
CO2 emissions will precipitate large increases in energy prices, reductions in energy use, and a 
decrease in economic output and welfare. The economy-wide character of the issue implies that 
elucidating the impacts of carbon taxes requires the kind of analysis for which CGE models are 
particularly well suited (Wing, 2004). Therefore, our first goal is to construct a CGE model which 
would  best  reflect  the  Israeli  economic  structure  with  detailed  disaggregation  of  energy  flows.  
Lacking  the  traditionally  used  GTAP
3  or  SEEA
4  databases,  we  constructed  a  consistent  Social 
Accounting Matrix for Israel in 1995. By applying the model to this benchmark we aim to answer 
the following research questions: 
1.  In what range would a carbon energy tax/ tradable permit prices need to lie in order to meet 
the Israeli potential Kyoto target for energy-related emissions of CO2 (7% reduction)? 
                                                  
2 NIS – New Israeli Sickles is the Israeli national currency. 
3The latest available  GTAP6 database (Dimaranan, 2006) doesn’t include disaggregation for the Israeli economy. The 
data on the Israeli economy appears as a part of  “Rest of the Middle East Countries”.  
4 The system of integrated economic and environmental accounts (SEEA) developed by United Nations et al. (2003) 
provides a framework for such a dataset, but it has not yet been implemented in Israel.   9
2.  What impact would this type of a carbon tax/ tradable permit system have on the Israeli 
economy, welfare and emissions? 
3.  How  would  this  carbon  tax/  tradable  permit  system  affect  sectoral  output,  household 
consumption patterns and demand for the various energy commodities? 
4.  How will a “sensitivity analysis” effect the model results?   
5.  Is an (employment) double dividend possible for the Israeli economy? 
6.  How do the following schemes for recycling the revenue of the carbon tax/ tradable permit 
system affect the results regarding: 
·  Proportional tax reduction 
·  Reduction of the labour tax rate 
3.  The Static Energy-Environment CGE Model for the Israeli Economy  
Our  research  introduces  the  first  energy-environment-CGE  model  for  Israel  with  specific 
detail in the area of taxation. It is a structural, real, static model of a small open economy with four 
energy commodities, 14 other commodities, a government, an investment agent, a foreign agent and 
a  single  representative  household.  It  incorporates  energy  flows  among  producers  and  between 
producers and consumers.  
CGE  models  are  simulations  that  combine  the  abstract  general  equilibrium  structure 
formalized by Arrow and Debreu with realistic economic data to solve numerically the levels of 
supply, demand and price that support equilibrium across a specified set of markets. CGE models 
are a standard tool of empirical analysis, and are widely used to analyze the aggregate welfare and 
distributional impacts of policies whose effects may be transmitted through multiple markets, or 
contain menus of different tax, subsidy, quota or transfer instruments. Examples of their use may be 
found in areas as diverse as fiscal reform and development planning (e.g., Perry et al 2001; Gunning 
and Keyzer 1995), international trade (e.g., Shields and Francois 1994; Martin and Winters 1996; 
Harrison et al. 1997), and increasingly, environmental regulation (e.g., Weyant 1999; Bovenberg 
and Goulder 1996; Goulder 2002). Kremers et al. (2002) provide a survey of CGE models for 
climate change policy analysis.  
3.1. General Features 
The general structure of this computable general equilibrium model is a familiar one which 
has  been  used  frequently  in  a  number  of  applications,  including  the  analysis  of  the  effects  of 
greenhouse  gas  emissions  restrictions,  as  noted  above.  The  standard  assumptions  of  market 
clearing, zero excess profits and balanced budget for each agent apply.  Commodity markets merge 
primary endowments of households with producer outputs. In equilibrium the aggregate supply of   10
each good must be at least as great as the total intermediate and final demand. Producer supplies 
and  demands  are  defined  by  producer  activity  levels  and  relative  prices.  Final  demands  are 
determined by market prices. The model is calibrated to the benchmark data.  
A  less  common  feature  is  the  separation  of  activities  from  commodities  which  permits 
activities to produce multiple commodities, while any commodity may be produced by multiple 
activities. In addition the model allows to export the imported commodities adopting the Armington 
assumption, as explained in section 3.3. It is assumed that the economy is in equilibrium in the 
benchmark. A policy simulation is implemented as a ‘counter-factual’ scenario, which consists of 
an exogenous set of shocks to the system. The model output shows the state of the economy after all 
markets  have  reached  a  new  equilibrium,  i.e.,  we  conduct  a  comparative-static  analysis
5.  The 
sectors and commodities are described in appendix B; the following sections present an overview of 
the model. 
3.2. Production Sector 
A firm can choose the quantity of each of the commodities it can produce. The output is 
divided  among  the  produced  commodities  with  a  CET
6  function,  where  the  elasticity  of 
transformation is equal to zero for all industries. This perfectly inelastic function ensures that the 
shares of commodities produced, in terms of quantity, remain the same during all simulations. The 
production process is represented by a nested production function as depicted in Figure 3 below. In 
the figure, the Allen elasticities of substitution are indicated with ‘s:’ and are identical for each 
industry  in  the  nest.  The  top-level  function  is  a  Leontief  function  (s:0)  which  determines  the 
producer’s demand for the aggregate factor input of labor, capital and intermediate energy KLE, 
and each of the intermediate (non-energy) inputs M(i) ) (KLEM
7 structure). CES
8 functions are 
applied for levels two to five of the production function. The elasticities of substitution between 
labour L and composite capital and energy, KE, and between aggregate energy E and capital K are 
adopted from Kemfert (1998)
9. Elasticities for the E and FOS nests are borrowed from GTAP-EG 
(Rutherford  &  Paltsev,  2000).  Finally,  crude  oil  and  oil  products  are  aggregated  in  a  Leontief 
function, as crude oil is only used in the oil refinery and any substitution between these two fuels 
should not occur. 
                                                  
5 Dellink (2005) shows how the modeling framework can be expanded to a fully dynamic analysis and discusses the 
validity of the comparative-static approach as an approximation. A good example of a dynamic multiregional model for 
climate policy is given in Böhringer and Welsch (2004). 
6 CET=Constant Elasticity of Transformation 
7 KLEM is an acronym commonly used in environmental economic modeling to identify production function structure 
nesting type of capital (K)-labour (L)- intermediate energy composite (E)- intermediate (non-energy) inputs (M) 
8CES=Constant Elasticity of  Substitution   
9 Kemfert (1998) econometrically estimates L-KE and K-E elasticities for German industry overall to be 0.846 and 
0.653, respectively. It is assumed that the Israeli economy has equal flexibility to German industry. 
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Figure 3: Nesting Structure of the Production Function 
 
In recent few years, electricity has been produced in Israel using natural gas too, but the latest 
Input-Output table of 1995 which was used in structuring the benchmark lacked the data on natural 
gas flows. 
3.3. International Trade 
To  accommodate  the  possibility  that  imported  commodities  are  exported,  the  Armington 
assumption
10 is applied in combining domestic production Y and imports IM, using a CES function. 
The resulting homogeneous ‘Armington commodities’ are either sold in Israel or exported. A CET 
function determines the scope for choice between domestic demand and export. The elasticity of 
substitution  between  Israeli  made  products  and  imports  (the  Armington  elasticity  in  the  CES 
function) as well as the elasticity of transformation between domestic sales and exports in the CET 
function, are set equal to 4 (Dellink, 2005). This creates substantial flexibility in choices about the 
destination and source of commodities.  
 
                                                  
10 Assumption: that imported and domestically produced commodities are substitutes of each other, but not perfect 
substitutes. This solves the problem that the same kind of good is found to be both exported and imported in actual trade 
data which is inconsistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin model under perfect competition (Armington, 1969). 
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3.4. Consumption 
Total  domestic  supply  of  each  commodity  is  assumed  to  exactly  meet  demand  (market 
clearing). Total demand is made up of intermediate demand and final demand, including household 
and government consumption, investment and exports. Intermediate demand is dealt with in the 
production  discussion.  Household  consumption,  as  well  as  investment  are  driven  by  the 
maximization of a Cobb-Douglas utility function subject to a budget constraint. Therefore, these 
agents respond to price incentives but keep the share of their budget spent on each commodity 
fixed. 
The household sector is represented by a single Representative Agent (RA). In our model, 18 
different goods exist – corresponding to productive sectors. The RA demands consumption goods 
and saves the remainder of her disposable income. The consumer’s objective is to maximize her 
utility, subject to her budget constraint. Utility is obtained from consumption goods according to a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function. The RA owns all factors of production, i.e., labour and capital. The 
RA’s income is made up of a net income deriving from the supply of labour and from the rental of 
capital plus net transfers. Household savings are exogenously fixed and equal to the sum of the 
government’s budget surplus and the balance of trade surplus less investments and the value of 
increases in stock. This ensures that the financial cycle is closed. RA consumption is taxed at a 
constant  rate.  Carbon  emitting  commodities  are  also  taxed  or  under  the  obligation  to  purchase 
emittion permits in the counter-factual scenarios. 
Government consumption and export are driven by the maximization of a Leontief utility 
function subject to a budget constraint. A Leontief function ensures that the shares of commodities, 
consumed by government, remain unchanged in terms of quantity during all simulations. This is a 
logical assumption, since the government consumption decision is hardly driven by the market.  The 
government raises taxes to obtain public revenue; whilst at the same time, gives net transfers, to the 
RA and abroad, and demands goods and services. Since the behavior of foreign consumers is not 
included in this single-country model, the Leontief function is used to keep the relative quantities of 
the different exported commodities fixed. Exports are traded for foreign exchange, which is used to 
pay for imports.  Balance of payment equals net imports.  
3.5. Taxation 
One  of  the  main  distinctive  features  of  the  model  is  its  relatively  detailed  modeling  of 
taxation. Seven taxes are modeled, out of which the pre-existing, i.e. present in the benchmark are: 
net taxes on products; net taxes on production; taxes on consumption; labour tax; capital tax and 
import tariffs. In some cases the indirect taxes are negative, indicating that subsidies are greater 
than taxes for that industry. Taxes on consumption are the share of indirect taxes on purchased   13
products paid by the RA. The share of labour tax and capital tax was calculated based on Ben Gad 
(2004) estimations.  The energy tax and the tradable emission permits system are introduced as 
counter-factual scenarios. In these simulated scenarios, both firms and households have to pay a tax 
on energy if their use of the energy commodity causes CO2 emissions. The tax rate is varied for 
each fuel, according to its carbon content. All tax revenue is collected by the government. The 
government  spends  all  revenue  (net  of  subsidies)  on  the  aggregate  commodity  and  exogenous 
transfers keeping its budget fixed.  
3.6. Market clearing conditions 
This class of equilibrium conditions refers to the supply of any commodity which must 
balance  the  demand  by  consumers  at  equilibrium  prices  and  activity  levels.  Domestic  demand 
equals demand for intermediate inputs to production, public sector use, final consumer demand plus 
domestic  investment  and  stock  change.  The  model  includes  supply-demand  conditions  for  the 
Armington composite goods. On the supply side, Armington composite goods equal the aggregation 
of  import  and  domestic  production,  whereas  the  demand  side  includes  domestic  and  export 
components.  Primary  factor  endowment  equals  primary  factor  demand.  Any  commodity  which 
commands  a  positive  price  has  a  balance  between  aggregate  supply  and  demand,  and  any 
commodity in excess supply has an equilibrium price of zero.  
3.7. Closure and Welfare Measurement 
The price of aggregate private consumption, the consumer price index, was chosen as the 
numéraire, the price relative to which all price changes are evaluated
11. This price being fixed at 
unity, means the total quantity of consumption equals the total value of consumption at all times. In 
our  model  we  measure  welfare  focusing  solely  on  private  household  consumption  while  the 
government purchases are fixed.  A change in total household consumption therefore equates a 
welfare change as measured by the Hicksian equivalent variation (EV). 
In all of the following simulations the government intends to implement the carbon energy 
tax/  auctioned  permits  as  an  equal  yield  policy,  preserving  total  tax  revenue  unchanged.  The 
revenue from the new green instrument must therefore be matched by a reduction in revenue from 
another  tax  or  taxes.  With  world  prices  fixed,  the  market  for  foreign  exchange  is  cleared  by 
fluctuations in the exchange rate. Labour and capital supplies are exogenously fixed
12. Markets for 
labour and capital are cleared by endogenous factor prices. The model is calibrated to the 1995 data 
base. Since the model is static, the output of the model must be interpreted as the new equilibrium is 
                                                  
11 Absolute price levels are undetermined in the model and only relative prices can be assessed. Fixing the consumer 
price index implies that inflation cannot occur.  
12  We change this assumption in Chapter 6.   14
reached after the economy has had time to adjust, but where changes in factor supply have not (yet) 
occurred. 
4.  Data 
4.1. A Social Accounting Matrix for Israel  
This section describes the construction of the SAM for Israel for the year 1995. This is the 
most  recent  year  for  which  the  Central  Bureau  of  Statistics  (CBS)  has  produced  Input-Output 
Tables (CBS, 2002), the main data source for the SAM.  
The initial task of building a SAM involves compiling data from various sources into a SAM 
framework. The CBS Supply Table (CBS 2002, Table 1, Version B) provides MAKE(j,i) matrix, at 
basic prices and then adds imports, trade margins and net taxes on commodities in order to arrive at 
the same totals for each commodity as in the Use Table, at purchaser’s prices (CBS 2002, Table 2, 
Version B). Labour and capital costs, net taxes on products and net production taxes are published 
as part of the CBS Use Table. Direct taxes are introduced following Ben Gad (2004) calculation. In 
the SAM, imports are valued at c.i.f.
13 prices and import duties were separated from product taxes. 
The transfers between agents are adopted from the CBS official site. Agent’s savings are embraced 
from national accounts (CBS, 1996). 
4.2. Disaggregation of Energy in the SAM 
In  order  to  simulate  climate  change  policies  in  relation  to  energy-related  carbon  dioxide 
emissions, it is first imperative to adequately model the following features (Wissema and Dellink, 
2007): 
• Energy flows among industries (intermediate demand); 
• Energy flows between industries and consumers (final demand including exports); 
• Tax paid on energy products; 
• Imports of energy products; 
• The cost structure of energy producing industries. 
The main energy sources and industries need to be distinguished separately in the model, and 
therefore also in the SAM. The SAM is built on the basis of a 14-industry aggregation IO Table, 
whilst  implementing  the  disaggregation  of  ‘Manufacture’  into  crude  oil  (COIL),  coal  (COAL), 
refined petroleum (ROIL), and other manufacturing (MNF). In addition, ‘Electricity and water’ 
sector is disaggregated over electricity (ELE) and water (WAT). The disaggregation procedure is 
performed  using  in  a  162-industry  aggregation  IO  Table  for  the  relevant  rows  and  columns. 
Consequently, 18 commodities/activities are presented in the final SAM. 
                                                  
13 The c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and freight) value represents the landed value of the merchandise at the first port of arrival 
in Israel   15
4.3. Emissions 
To establish the relationship between the levels of production and demand activities and the 
quantity  of  emissions  we  assumed  a  fixed  stoichiometric  relationship  between  the  aggregate 
demand for  fossil fuel  commodities in which carbon is embodied (i.e., coal, refined and  crude 
petroleum)  and  the  quantity  of  atmospheric  CO2  emissions  that  result  from  their  use.  This 
relationship was estimated using Table C data on CO2 emissions by sector presented in Appendix 
C. The result is a set of commodity-specific emission coefficients, which when multiplied by each 
fossil  fuel’s  aggregate  demand  in  the  SAM,  reproduces  the  economy’s  CO2  emissions  in  the 
benchmark year.  
5.  Preliminary Simulation Results and Economic Interpretation 
The  subsequent  sections  outline  the  results  of  two  policy  simulations  (carbon  tax  and 
auctioned emission permits system) in different environments, following the closure rule introduced 
in Section 3.7. The policy variables are model parameters that are either price-based (carbon taxes) 
or  quantity-based  (auctioned  carbon  emission  permits),  and  whose  values  are  exogenously 
specified. 
5.1. Energy Tax Simulations 
Our model simulates the effect of imposing a range of ad-valorem taxes on CO2 emissions, 
differentiated according to the emission factor of each energy source. The model is simulated to 
reproduce the benchmark as a baseline no-policy case, with the imposition of carbon taxes at levels 
of NIS 50, NIS 100, NIS 150 and NIS 200 per ton of carbon
14. The government allocates the carbon 
tax revenue to uniformly reduce the existing distorting taxes. 
The sectoral impacts of carbon taxes are detailed in Table 2. The top panel shows that a $ 
16.67/ton carbon tax raises the consumer prices of petroleum and electricity by about 5 percent and 
makes coal more expensive by a quarter, while a $ 66.67/ton increases the prices of refined oil and 
electricity by more than 17 percent and the price of coal by almost 100 percent. Crude oil and water 
prices rise by 1-3 percent; transport sector prices experience a minor increase up to less than a half 
percent and agriculture and the rest of the economy consumer prices decline up to 1 percent.   
These price changes induce large adjustments in the quantities of fossil fuels used as inputs by 
producers  and  households,  where  inter-fuel  substitution  enables  reductions  in  demand  to  be 
concentrated in the most carbon-intensive energy source, coal. Thus, in the second and third panels 
found in Table 2, sectors see a decline in coal use by 10-40 percent, while in the non-fossil- fuel 
                                                  
14 Corresponding to US $ 16⅔, 33⅓, 50 and 60⅔ in 1995 prices. The values of carbon tax are equivalent to taxes on 
CO2 that are less than one-third as large $4.6,  $9.1, $13.6 and  $18.17 per ton of CO2 respectively.   16
sectors (agriculture, manufacture, water and the rest of the economy in panels 4 and 5 of the table), 
demands for both petroleum and electricity decline by 2-11 percent. In these latter sectors of the 
economy,  substitution  of  non-energy  inputs  for  fossil  fuels  mitigates  the  transmission  of  the 
reductions in the output of primary  energy sectors. The  fifth panel in the table shows that the 
reduction in electricity demand is between 6-19 percent in refineries; 10-27 percent in the electricity 
sector itself and 1-11 percent in the other sectors. As a result, the level of output falls by 5-17 
percent in electric power and refineries; 2-5 percent in water industry; 0.2-2 percent in agriculture, 
manufacture and transportation; and only 0.1-0.3 percent in the rest of the economy, as indicates the 
final panel. These changes in activity levels correspond closely to changes in the consumption of 
the corresponding commodities by the representative agent. 
Table 2: The Sectoral Impacts of Carbon Taxes on the Israeli Economy 
Carbon Tax 
($, 1995)  Agriculture  Refined 
OIL 
Crude 
OIL  COAL  Manu-
facture 
Electri-




Changes in Gross-of-Tax Commodity Prices (percent) 
16.67  -0.91  4.55  1.08  25.04  -0.01  5.54  1.61  0.10  -0.09 
33.3  -1.03  8.92  1.39  49.63  -0.06  9.70  2.12  0.21  -0.18 
50  -1.09  13.34  1.76  74.27  -0.17  13.59  2.55  0.27  -0.28 
66.67  -1.15  17.78  2.14  98.92  -0.27  17.27  2.94  0.33  -0.37 
Changes in Final Consumption by Commodity (percent) 
16.67  -0.53  -6.04  -4.84  -13.70  -0.50  -4.96  -1.31  -0.87  -0.15 
33.3  -1.04  -10.24  -9.31  -24.18  -0.98  -8.52  -2.10  -1.73  -0.30 
50  -1.29  -13.83  -12.43  -32.01  -1.21  -11.41  -2.55  -2.20  -0.33 
66.67  -1.53  -17.14  -15.86  -38.28  -1.43  -13.99  -2.96  -2.65  -0.36 
Changes in Demand for Coal by Sector (percent) 
16.67  -10.55  -15.48  -  -  -10.75  -14.36  -  -  - 
33.3  -19.32  -25.93  -  -  -19.35  -23.94  -  -  - 
50  -25.92  -33.86  -  -  -25.82  -31.14  -  -  - 
66.67  -31.25  -40.25  -  -  -31.02  -36.91  -  -  - 
Changes in Demand for Petroleum by Sector (percent) 
16.67  -2.17  -6.21  -  -  -2.39  -6.34  -4.30  -3.31  -1.34 
33.3  -5.44  -10.46  -  -  -5.48  -10.85  -7.07  -6.47  -2.58 
50  -8.14  -14.10  -  -  -8.02  -14.61  -9.30  -9.07  -3.62 
66.67  -10.65  -17.46  -  -  -10.35  -18.00  -11.33  -11.49  -4.58 
Changes in Demand for Electricity by Sector (percent) 
16.67  -2.33  -6.57  -  -  -2.75  -10.07  -4.39  -3.32  -1.41 
33.3  -5.63  -11.08  -  -  -6.03  -17.05  -7.14  -6.45  -2.64 
50  -8.33  -14.91  -  -  -8.69  -22.59  -9.32  -9.01  -3.67 
66.67  -10.81  -18.42  -  -  -11.11  -27.28  -11.29  -11.37  -4.60 
Changes in Sectoral Activity Levels (percent) 
16.67  -0.24  -5.45  -  -  -1.24  -6.34  -2.71  -0.67  -0.16 
33.3  -0.72  -9.79  -  -  -1.68  -10.43  -3.78  -1.34  -0.32 
50  -0.90  -13.52  -  -  -1.82  -13.71  -4.42  -1.63  -0.32 
66.67  -1.08  -16.97  -  -  -1.95  -16.61  -5.00  -1.91  -0.33 
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Figure 4 plots the sectoral marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves derived from the model’s 
solution. The bulk of abatement occurs in the electric power sector which is responsible for twice as 
much  of  a  reduction  in  emissions  as  in  all  the  other  sectors  of  the  economy  put  together 
(approximately 3000-7,360 Kton). Less than a quarter as much abatement (500-1600 Kton) takes 
place in the household  and rest of the economy  sectors.  Further abatement (210-980 Kton) is 
generated by the manufacture and transportation sectors. The results indicate that while there may 
be  substantial  low-cost  abatement  opportunities  (less  than  $  16.67/ton)  in  the  transportation 
industry, incremental emission reductions are likely to be exhausted with greater tax levels. 
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The environmental  and  welfare consequences of carbon taxes are shown in Table 3. The 
model indicates that the modest carbon tax of $ 16.67/ton reduces the overall CO2 emissions by 
more than 9 percent from the initial level of 49,748,000 tons, which is more than the Kyoto Protocol 
target set for most of the European countries, whereas a $ 66.67/ton tax could cut emissions by 
almost a quarter, which would incur a welfare cost of almost 0.9 percent and almost a one percent 
reduction in GDP.  
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0  49,748.00  -  -  - 
16.67  45,158.11  4,589.89  -0.27%  -0.31% 
33.3  42,155.29  7,592.71  -0.54%  -0.61% 
50  39,804.96  9,943.04  -0.72%  -0.79% 
66.67  37,802.36  11,945.65  -0.89%  -0.96% 
5.2. Auctioned Emission Permits System 
Within our model, the carbon tax policy is equivalent to an auctioned emission permits system 
where the permit price coincides with the carbon tax. The government auctions permits between all 
energy users in the economy and allocates the revenue to uniformly reduce the existing distorting 
taxes. For simplicity, it is assumed that no net international trading takes place. 
The  environmental  and  welfare  consequences  of  a  7  percent  emissions  reduction  via  an 
auctioned permit system to simulate Israeli economy meeting the Protocol Kyoto targets is shown 
in Table 4. 













9.03  46,265.6  3,482.36  -0.09  -0.12 
 
If the Israeli economy aims to reduce 7 percent of its  CO2 emissions following the Kyoto 
agreement, 46 thousand 257 permits valued at 1 kton of the CO2 emissions each may be auctioned 
between the sectors of the economy. The equilibrium price of the permit would reach $ 9.03 (1995 
prices). Welfare and GDP would decrease by 0.09 and 0.12 percent respectively.  
5.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
Following  van  der  Werf’s  (2007)  empirical  estimation  of  production  function  for  climate 
policy models for OECD countries, we checked the consistency of our results not only by continual 
change  of  elasticities,  but  also  by  modifying  the  labor-capital-energy  nesting  structure  of  the 
production function. 
In our basic analysis capital and energy are combined first, as is done in the GREEN model 
(Burniaux et al., 1992), since (physical) capital and energy generally operate jointly. However, van 
der Werf found that the (KL)E nesting structure, in which capital and labour are combined first and   19
subsequently combined with energy (or an energy-materials composite), fits the data better than 
(KE)L or (LE)K nesting structures. We adapted the (KL)E nesting structure for the production 
function  leaving  the  rest  of  the  nests  in  Figure  3  above  unchanged.  In  addition,  lacking  an 
econometric  estimation  of  elasticities  of  substitution  between  labor,  capital  and  the  energy 
aggregate for the Israeli economy, we ran the model twice more implementing the elasticities of 
substitution evaluated by van der Werf for Finnish and Italian economies. The Finnish economy 
was chosen for its relative similarity in magnitude, whereas the Italian elasticities were adjusted to 
reflect the lack of natural energy resources common to both Italy and Israel. Figure 5 mirrors the 
initial  and  the  resulting  production  function  structures.  The  elasticities  of  substitution  between 
labour and capital were estimated at about the same value of 0.5 for Italy and Finland, whereas the 
elasticities of substitution between energy aggregate and labour – capital composite for Italy is half 
that  of  Finland,  and  they  are  both  substantially  lower  than  that  used  for  the  initial  simulation. 
Accordingly, the new production functions represent lower substitution ability between energy and 
primary factors with Italian elasticity representing the lowest substitution possibility. From here on 
we  refer  to  the  initial  L(KE)  production  function  as  "  Production  Function  A";  the  production 
function with E(KL) nest and Finnish elasticities as "Production Function B"; and to the production 

















   20




























Figure 6 illustrates the resulting economy-wide MAC curves for each production function. As 
the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  primary  factors  and  energy  inputs  lowers,  production  has 
lower possibility to substitute away from energy. As a result, the MAC becomes more inflexible 
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The economic impacts of carbon taxes and auctioned permits in the view of 3 production 
functions  are  compared  in  Table  5.  As  expected,  production  functions  B  and  C  allow  less 
substitution between energy inputs and primary factors, thus for an equal value of carbon tax, the 
emission  reduction  is  lower.  However,  even  the  least  flexible  elasticity  production  function  C 
produces  almost  6-15.5  percent  CO2  emission  reduction  for  carbon  tax  of  $16⅔-$66⅔.  
Experiencing  an  equate  price  increase,  energy  sectors  in  cases  B  and  C  suffer  lower  demand 
reduction and pull the economy to a smoother change in welfare and the GDP:  0.08-0.14 percent 
change in cases B and C compared to about a 0.3 percent change in case A.    
The  comparison  of  a  7  percent  emission  reduction  using  auctioned  permits  provides  an 
additional  confirmation  to  the  preceding  results.  Following  the  previous  observation  that,  for  a 
carbon  tax  the  emission  reduction  is  lower  in  stiffer  elasticities  of  substitution  functions,  the 
equivalent emission decrease level results in the equilibrium permit price as sufficiently higher for 
production functions B and C and the economic cost is larger.  
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Table 5: The Aggregate Economic Impacts of Carbon Taxes and Auctioned Permits via 
Production Function definition. 
Production Function C  Production Function B  Production Function A 
Permit  Carbon tax  Permit  Carbon tax  Permit  Carbon tax 
21  66.67  16.67  14.2  66.67  16.67  9.03  66.67  16.67 
($, 1995) 








-0.11  -0.36  -0.08  -0.10  -0.50  -0.11  -0.09  -0.89  -0.27  Welfare 
Change (%) 
-0.16  -0.49  -0.12  -0.13  -0.57  -0.14  -0.12  -0.96  -0.31  GDP 
Change (%) 
 
This chapter shows that a carbon energy tax, i.e., a specific energy tax related to carbon 
dioxide  emissions  from  energy  use  of  $  16.67-66.67,  leads  to  significant  emission  reductions 
followed by a minor decrease in economic parameters. The model tells us that the negative impact 
of auctioned permits and the carbon tax on overall welfare and GDP is minor even when parameter 
values are changed. No double dividend is identified though. Changes in the patterns of sectoral 
production  and  consumption  can  be  clearly  observed.  Simulating  a  stiffer  production  function 
which allows less substitution between capital – labour and energy composites, we find that the tax 
is less effective in reducing carbon emissions yet the economic costs are lower too. 
6.  Introducing Labour Market Imperfections 
The economic literature has emphasized the impact that recycled fiscal revenues could have 
on relevant macroeconomic variables, such as output and employment. In Europe, given the high 
level of taxation on labour and the persistent high levels of unemployment, the debate has been 
concentrated upon the existence of a so-called “employment double dividend” i.e. the possibility of 
achieving better environmental quality by taxing pollutants and lower unemployment rates by using 
green tax revenues to lower taxes on labour, the high level of these often being perceived as one of 
the causes of high unemployment rates (Daveri and Tabellini, 2000). The debate in Israel may also 
focus on achieving the “employment double dividend” because of high preliminary labour taxation 
and unemployment levels. Since the unemployment level in Israel has been above 7% for more than 
a  decade,  we  consider  the  importance  of  indicating  the  possibility  of  the  “employment  double 
dividend” for the Israeli economy. For this purpose we introduce unemployment in our base model.    23
6.1. Model Extensions 
In order to investigate the double and employment dividend hypotheses unemployment was 
introduced in the model. The unemployment rate is determined through a wage equation which 
postulates a negative relationship between the real wage rate and the rate of employment: 




where P denotes a consumer goods price index (CPI) and u is the unemployment rate, taken to 
be 6.9% for 1995 in Israel. This type of wage equation can be derived from trade union wage 
models, as well as from efficiency wage models (e.g., Hutton and Ruocco, 1999). To implement the 
wage equation into the modelling procedure we followed the methodology provided by Kuster et al. 
(2007). 
In the current chapter we continue to use production function C, following van der Werf's 
(2007) recommendation upon E(KL) nesting structure and to implement elasticities of substitution 
as evaluated for Italy, between the energy aggregate and the labor-capital composite to reflect the 
absence of natural energy resources in Israel.  This chapter enhances the model presented in chapter 
3 with the following major: 
• Endogenous labour supply  
• Involuntary unemployment  
Labour supply is endogenous and depends on relative changes in the wage rate. Endogenous 
involuntary  unemployment  is  controlled  by  a  real  wage  rate.  The  unemployment  rate  has  a 
minimum bound equal to 5 percent, to reflect frictional unemployment (Layard et al., 1991). A 
relatively high frictional unemployment rate is assumed due to the unique structure of the Israeli 
labour force, where a fairly significant fraction of persons of a working age  stay unemployed for 
social or religious reasons. Other assumptions on model agents' behaviour remain unchanged. 
6.2. Green Policy Simulations 
The energy tax simulations continue to employ the carbon tax range of $ 16.67-66.67 in 1995 
prices.  However,  contrary  to  previous  chapter  simulations  where  carbon  tax/auctioned  permits 
revenue was recycled to proportionally reduce all the existing taxes, in the simulations presented in 
this chapter, once the environmental tax rate is exogenously fixed, the compensating income tax 
(IT) is decreased with the criterion of keeping real public deficit unchanged. 
Table 6 displays the main results, including the CO2 emissions (ktons), emission abatement 
(%), the welfare change (%), the real GDP change (%), the labour/capital index change (%) and 
unemployment (%)  with respect to the benchmark situation.   24





















-  49,748.00  -  -  -  -  6.90% 
16.67  46,663.13  6.2%  -0.05%  -0.08%  0.2%  5.96% 
33.3  45256.75  9.0%  -0.14%  -0.21%  0.5%  5.32% 
50  43652.38  12.3%  -0.24%  -0.33%  0.7%  5.11% 




46,265.6  7%  -0.08%  -0.12%  0.3%  5.79% 
 
When the carbon tax is compensated with IT, emissions monotonically decrease with the tax 
rate, as expected, reaching the 16 percent reduction for the highest carbon tax level.  Nominal 
output increases but as prices also increase, the GDP decreases in real terms of up to 0.45 percent. 
As  a  consequence  of  lower  labour  costs,  unemployment  rate  monotonically  decreases,  almost 
reaching the frictional unemployment level, so that an employment double dividend arises. At this 
point we indicate that reduction in IT overpowers the distorting effects of the environmental tax.  
The introduction of carbon taxes has an inflationary effect, which is especially evident at the 
welfare stage, causing an increase in nominal wages. However, this effect is counteracted by labour 
tax cuts. The fact that welfare falls up to 0.34 percent can also be partly explained by the drop in 
income: income from labour increases (by 1.85%) due to higher labour demand, but income from 
capital falls (by more than 2.64%) due to the lower rental rate. Capital supply is fixed and demand 
must equal supply, so the actual quantity demanded cannot change, but the price of capital drops to 
more than the net wage rate (labour/capital price index decrease), reflecting the relative abundance 
of capital in the new equilibrium, compared to the other production inputs.  
Inspecting the sectoral impacts of the carbon taxation provides the explanation for an increase 
in employment: the reduction in income tax lowers the labour costs for employers in relation to 
other factors and in particular to the simultaneously increased price of energy due to the carbon tax. 
Therefore, the demand for labour in non energy-intensive sectors increases. The offsetting effect is 
the overall activity decrease of the economy induced by more expensive energy factors (prices 
increased from about 4 to 17 and a half percent in case of refined oil and electricity and up to 98 
percent for coal).   25
Employing corresponding auctioned permit system to reduce 7 percent of CO2 emissions the 
model results indicate that the equilibrium price of the permit will reach about $21
2/3 (in 1995 
prices).  Welfare  and  GDP  would  decrease  by  0.08  and  0.12  percent  respectively,  while  the 
unemployment  levels  may  decrease  according  to  our  simulation  by  a  considerable  1.3%. 
Correspondingly, an employment double dividend arises in this case too. 
Our  main  result  reflects  the  possibility  to  gain  an  employment  dividend  and  follows  the 
evidence  obtained  by  several  studies,  concerning  the  strongly  distorting  effects  of  labour  taxes 
(Manresa  and  Sancho,  2005).  While  the  effect  of  a  green  tax  reform  does  not  yield  a  second 
dividend  in  the  standard  model  assuming  perfect  functioning  of  all  markets,  as  we  confirm  in  
Chapter 5, it yields a welfare improving employment effect in the model which allows for labour 
market imperfections.  
However, there are two effects in our model that decrease the overall cost of carbon emission 
control: First, the “carbon leakage” phenomenon, which means that reduced domestic emissions 
may cause higher emissions abroad (Lee and Roland-Holst (2000), Roson (2001)). Second, since 
foreign  and  domestic  goods  are  imperfect  substitutes,  there  are  changes  in  the  terms  of  trade, 
implying that foreign consumers actually bear part of the carbon tax burden. These changes in the 
terms of trade are partly explained by the fact that our research focuses on a single country, ignoring 
international policy feedbacks. Evidently, refined oil import increases by up to 4 percent for the 
highest  carbon  tax  level,  substituting  away  the  local  production.  However,  the  Kyoto  protocol 
imposes similar reductions in CO2 emissions for several Israeli trade partners; if foreign prices also 
arise,  there  would  be  less  scope  for  substituting  domestic  products  with  imports,  and  a  less 
significant impact on the terms of trade.  
6.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
This section compares some of the results presented above with those obtained when the 
elasticities  of  substitution  are  changed,  in  order  to  test  how  sensitive  welfare,  abatement  and 
unemployment results to variations in parameters’ values.  
At the first stage of the sensitivity analysis we altered the elasticity of substitution between 
labour-capital composite and the energy composite (LKE) holding the carbon tax at $ 16⅔ level. 
The values varied from 0 to 1 (van der Werf’s, 2007, estimated LKE elasticities of substitution for 
OECD countries show 0.17-0.61 range). The transformations obtained with the default elasticity 
value are given in bold, with which the changes above and below can be compared. The simulation 
results summarized in Table 7 appear to be quite robust. As the elasticity of substitution between 
the  labour-capital  composite  and  the  energy  composite  grows,  energy  conservation  is  achieved 
more  easily  by  substitution  towards  labour  and  capital.  Therefore  the  emission  abatement  and   26
employment increase. However, the welfare cost increases too, identifying that higher elasticity 
values tend to increase the distortionary effect of the carbon tax. Behaviour, in terms of quantities 
purchased or produced further changes, creating a bigger deadweight loss.  
Table 7: Sensitivity of economic indicators to individual changes in the value of the elasticity 
of substitution between labour-capital and energy composites (compared to the benchmark); 














0  48594.15  2.32%  -0.04%  -0.06%  5.98% 
0.25  47658.09  4.20%  -0.05%  -0.08%  5.96% 
0.5  46749.05  6.03%  -0.06%  -0.10%  5.94% 
0.75  45866.06  7.80%  -0.08%  -0.13%  5.93% 
1  45008.18  9.53%  -0.11%  -0.15%  5.91% 
 
Alternatively we vary the values of LKE elasticity of substitution while keeping the emission 
reduction target at 7% employing the auctioned permits system. In this case, results presented in 
Table 8 show that, as the  LKE elasticity of substitution increases, the  abatement target can be 
received with lower economic costs. In equilibrium, the auctioned permit price declines, indicating 
that lower carbon tax is needed in order to achieve the desirable abatement level. Furthermore, for 
the value of LKE elasticity of substitution equalled 0.5 and higher, not only the employment but 
also the welfare and GDP changes are positive. In fact, this simulation shows a (limited) strong 
double dividend result. 
Table 8: Sensitivity of economic indicators to individual changes in the value of the elasticities 
of substitution between labour-capital and energy composites (compared to the benchmark); 
7% abatement target. 
S:LKE  Permit Price 
 ($, 1995) 
Welfare Change 
from Benchmark 
Real GDP Change 
from Benchmark  Unemployment  
0  34.21  -0.30%  -0.40%  6.09% 
0.25  21.33  -0.08%  -0.12%  5.59% 
0.50  15.57  0.03%  0.02%  5.39% 
0.75  11.98  0.04%  0.10%  5.29% 
1.00  9.46  0.05%  0.15%  5.22% 
The value of the elasticity of substitution at the top level S(TOP) is also mildly influential.  
The top level of the production function is normally Leontief, but for the analysis it was changed to 
Cobb-Douglas. This creates the opportunity to conserve energy by substituting other intermediate 
inputs for composite labour-capital-energy in order to avoid paying the carbon tax. Indeed, the non 
energy-intensive sectors, indicated as “Rest of the economy” in the previous analyses, show very   27
limited participation in abatement in the case of Cobb-Douglas top level elasticity of substitution. 
As shown in Table 9, this magnitude tends to distort the economy more and brings down welfare 
for a given carbon tax level. Alternatively, if a 7 percent emission abatement is the goal, it can be 
reached by lower permit price/ carbon tax when the top level elasticity of substitution is Cobb-
Douglas. The welfare cost is lower, but the unemployment decrease is lower too, signalling that the 
higher substitution of intermediate inputs for labour-capital-energy composite limits the effect of 
increased demand for labour through lowering the income tax.  Consequently, we can only argue 
for an employment double dividend for the higher top level elasticity of substitution.    
Table 9: Sensitivity of economic indicators to individual changes in the value of the top level 
elasticity of substitution (compared to the benchmark): carbon tax range $ 16⅔;                   
7% abatement via tradable permits. 
CO2 Abatement  Welfare Change 
from Benchmark  Unemployment 
 
Stop=0  Stop=1  Stop=0  Stop=1  Stop=0  Stop=1 
Carbon tax ($, 1995) 
$ 16⅔  6.2%  6.37%  -0.05%  -0.17%  5.96%  6.7% 
7% Abatement - Auctionable Permits 
7%  $21.33  $19.65  -0.08%  -0.06%  5.59%  6.6% 
7.  Summary and Discussion  
The research presented here expands the academic discussion on climate change mitigation 
strategies in Israel. The purpose of this study is to determine whether policy makers in Israel could 
introduce environmental taxation in the form of the CO2 emission tax, without aggravating the 
problems of unemployment and decrease in welfare.  It is particularly  relevant following recent 
negotiation for Post Kyoto agreement which is expected to engage all UNFCCC parties for the 
mutual mitigation effort.  
Our literature survey revealed that although CGE models are commonly used in economic 
literature to investigate the economy-wide nature of carbon tax schemes, no such model for Israel 
had been previously developed. 
In the current research we adopt the CGE model to the Israeli economy in order to study the 
effects of green tax reforms on environmental quality, the economic burden of the tax system and, 
eventually, the level of unemployment. To this end, a consistent and balanced disaggregated SAM 
for Israel in 1995 is constructed. 
Our counter-factual analyses started by imposing carbon emission taxes ranging from $ 16⅔ 
to $ 66⅔ ( in 1995 prices) on the revenue neutral basis. Alternatively, the auctioned permits system 
was established to achieve a 7 percent abatement. The accumulated income served to proportionally   28
reduce the pre-existing taxes. In these preliminary simulations an exogenous labour supply was 
assumed. 
 The main conclusions from this part of the study are the following: First, the reduction target 
for energy related CO2 emissions in Israel of 7 percent compared to 1995 levels can be achieved 
with a carbon energy tax of between approximately $ 9 and $ 21 per tonne of carbon  under various 
assumptions considering the structure of production function. Fuel switching is an important part of 
achieving the target, and the sensitivity analysis shows that this result is sensitive to the possibilities 
for producers to substitute away from energy use. Lower substitution possibilities make emissions 
respond less to a given tax level, so that the target should be reached with higher tax levels.  
Secondly, the macroeconomic impact of the tax would not be very strong, as GDP decreased 
by less than 1 percent even at the highest $ 66⅔ per tonne of carbon tax level. Welfare would be 
affected downwards, but only by a small percentage even at relatively high tax levels. However, no 
double dividend was identified.  
In attempt to approximate the model to better reflect the Israeli labour market, involuntary 
unemployment was introduced. The mitigating policy was yet again implying $ 16⅔ to $ 66⅔ tax 
per ton of carbon or simulating the 7 percent emission reduction via auctioned permits system, but 
this time the revenues were directed to cut the labour tax.   
The  simulated  environmental  policy  implied  a  large  negative  shock  to  domestic  energy-
intensive production. This entailed significant stranded costs and a large reduction in employment 
in the energy-intensive industries. However, income tax cuts reduced the labour costs in relation to 
other factors and the demand for labour from non-energy intensive sectors increased lowering the 
overall unemployment level. Therefore, we can conclude that an employment double dividend is an 
empirical possibility under a rather standard set of model characteristics. Moreover, for a higher 
substitutability  between  energy  composite  and  the  labour-capital  one,  a  (limited)  strong  double 
dividend can be obtained.  
While model results are not greatly affected by changes in most of the parameters’ values, the 
most  influential  elasticities  are  those  that  affect  the  possibilities  for  energy  conservation  by 
substitution  towards  labour  -  capital  composite.  In  the  event  that  the  carbon  tax  level  is  kept 
constant, increasing their values implies welfare reduction while the emission target is overshot. 
However, when the possibilities for energy conservation are thus increased and steady emission 
reduction is the aim, a lower, less distortionary, carbon tax level is required or alternatively the 
auctioned equilibrium permit price will be inferior. We conclude therefore that for Israel, energy 
conservation appears to be the key to a double dividend.    29
In  conclusion,  a  second  dividend  of  environmental  taxes  in  the  form  of  an  employment 
dividend exists is an achievable goal in the case of the Israeli economy. Using green tax revenues to 
reduce  labour  taxes  will  reduce  unemployment  and  for  high  energy-labour-capital  substituting 
possibilities  may  even  raise  welfare.  Our  research  verifies  that  pre-existing  market  distortions 
provide another rationale for the introduction of environmental taxes. 
The major limitation of the analysis is the age of the data base. An operational data base is 
compiled using officially published input–output tables, expenditure surveys, and national product 
and income accounts. Unfortunately, these data sources are not updated with the required speed, at 
least not for the modeler, and a few compromises linking and unifying them in a micro consistent 
way have to be adopted. It is for this reason why simulation results showing a double dividend 
should be taken as an indication of what may be possible and not as any definite proof.  
In the case of the Input – Output table for Israel in 1995 which served as the main basis for 
the SAM not only is the age of the data is problematic for drawing policy implications, but so is the 
absence of the natural gas sector in the data. Indeed, as recently as 2004, the Israeli primary energy 
supply did not include natural gas. However, a structural change using natural gas was possible 
following an agreement signed in 2005 between Israel and Egypt which enables Israel to purchase 
natural gas from Egypt, to be used by the Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) for a period of 15 years. 
In addition, natural gas reserves have been discovered off the coast of Israel. As a result, the share 
of natural gas in the primary energy supply mix grew from about 1 percent in 2004 to 18 percent in 
2006 and is expected to rise up to 50 percent in the following decade. This new energy source, 
which is characterized by lower carbon intensity may reduce the economic costs of the explored 
mitigating policies even further than projected in this research.  
 Next  important  shortcoming  is  the  model’s  neglect  of  the  “putty-clay”  nature  of  capital. 
Jacoby and Sue Wing (1999) demonstrated the importance of capital rigidity in determining the 
short-run costs of the U.S. economy’s adjustment to GHG emission constraints. Yet, in our analysis 
production is modeled as being completely reversible, and capital is modeled as a homogeneous, 
mobile  factor  whose  input  may  be  reallocated  frictionally  among  producers  as  relative  prices 
change.  In  reality,  reductions  in  activity  would  likely  entail  substantial  capital  scrappage  and 
associated short-run costs. The analysis can therefore be significantly improved by specifying all or 
some of the capital input to each individual sector as a separate factor that is inelastically supplied 
and has its own sector-specific price. The likely consequence would be a substantial reduction in the 
mobility of and returns to capital — especially in declining sectors, with concomitant additional 
reductions in the representative agent’s income and increases in the welfare costs of abatement.   30
In  addition,  our  efficiency  notion  is  essentially  neoclassical.  We  measured  induced  tax 
distortions  using  a  direct  intra-personal  percentage  utility  change  based  only  on  private 
commodities consumption. Publicly provided goods, environmental quality or leisure do not enter 
the utility function. A broader welfare concept could possibly include these magnitudes, but it is not 
immediately obvious how they would affect the preference relation.  
The  representation  of  the  energy  industry  can  be  enhanced  by  disaggregating  renewable 
energy commodities and by introducing imperfect competition; a feature that is still relevant for the 
Israeli electricity market. The representation of demand for energy can be improved by modeling 
the use of renewable energy sources such as solar energy by households. Since climate change is a 
long  term  problem,  the  introduction  of  intertemporal  dynamics  is  recommended.  It  is  further 
recommended to introduce foreign energy policies to affect the world price. Alternative revenue 
recycling  schemes  should  be  explored.  Moreover,  it  is  possible  and  desirable  to  include  other 
greenhouse gases than carbon dioxide and even to incorporate other environmental problems and 
solutions.  Different  environmental  problems  and  their  solutions  tend  to  interact  and  are  best 
analyzed in an integrated manner (Dellink, 2005). 
It is important to assess the impact of different combinations of policy measures on income 
distribution in general and on the welfare of households of different income groups in particular. 
Low-income  households  need  special  attention  because  a  carbon  energy  tax  may  push  certain 
households into poverty and enhance the existing problems with fuel-poverty (Healy, 2003). Our 
research uses a single representative household and therefore does not offer this kind of insight. For 
this analysis it would be necessary to distinguish different income groups and model the relevant 
linkages between these household groups and the rest of the economy, including the government, in 
sufficient detail.  
Despite all qualifications above, and on general economic grounds, a strong point can be 
made to support energy tax policies as a singular tool of choice for achieving a better environmental 
quality and a lower inefficiency level (in utility or unemployment) at zero revenue cost for the 
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APPENDIX A GHG Emission 2004 
Table A: Summary of GHG emissions and removals (2004). 
 (Source: Israeli Union for Environmental Defense, 2007) 
Sector  CO2  CH4  N2O  Total CO2 
equivalent 
Energy (Fuel combustion)  63,134  3.34  0.724  63,428 
Energy Industries  41,615  0.697  0.53  41,794 
Manufacture & Construction  6,041  0.15  0.05  6,058 
Transport  14,320  2.32  0.14  14,412 
Commercial/institutional/Residential/Other  1,157  0.172  0.01  1,164 
Industrial Processes   2,115    1.95  2,719 
Agriculture    67.26  4.62  2,846 
Forestry  -370      -370 
Waste    236    4,948 
Total  65,249  306.2  7.3  73,572 
 
APPENDIX B SECTORS AND COMMODITIES IN THE SAM 
The sectors and commodities have the same acronyms, as each commodity is produced mainly by 
one corresponding sector. Each industry can thus be regarded as the main producer or manufacturer 
of the product with the same acronym. Table B therefore gives descriptions of commodities only. 
Table B. Commodities in the SAM and the Model 
 
Sector i  Model 
Acronyms  
CBS 
code  Descriptions 
1  AFF  A  Agriculture                                          
2  ROIL  B 70  Refined petroleum   
3  COIL  B 37  Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas  
4  COAL  B 36  Mining and agglomeration of hard coal 
5  MNF  B  Manufacturing                                                                                                                                                                                                       
6  ELE  C 124  Electricity  
7  WAT  C 125  Water  
8  CON  D  Construction  (building and civil engineering projects)                  
9  TRD  E  Wholesale and retail trade, repairs of vehicles and other repairs 
10  ASR  F  Accommodation  services and restaurants 
11  TRC  G  Transport, storage and communications                  
12  BIF  H  Banking, insurance and other financial institutions  
13  BAC  I  Real estate, renting and business activities                 
14  PAD  J  Public administration  
15  EDU  K  Education        
16  HWS  L  Health services, and welfare and social work               
17  CSS  M,N  Community, social, personal and other services, and services for 
households by domestic personnel       
18  IBS  162   Imputed bank services and general expenses  
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APPENDIX C Sectoral fuel consumption and emission 
Table C: Fuel consumption and CO2 emissions by sectors. (Source: Avnimelech, 2002) 
Sector  Electricity 
production 
Manufacture  Transport  Residential and 
commercial 

















LPG       124  366       404  1,194 
Gasoline            2,159  6,657      
Diesel Oil  137  435  900  2,859  1,013  2,876  199  632 
Naphtha       769              
Residual 
Fuel Oil  2,031  6,252  2,277  7,099           
Petrol. 
Coke        168  675           
Tar            267  821      
Coal  8,190  19,882                
Total CO2 
emissions    26,569    10,999    10,354    1,826 
% of total 
emission     53.47%     22.13%     20.84%     3.67% 
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